- UBT - a primordial realm of infocognitive potential free of informational constraint. In CTMU cosmogony, "nothingness" is informationally defined as zero constraint or pure freedom (unbound telesis or UBT), and the apparent construction of the universe is explained as a self-restriction of this potential.
- If UBT is essential to logic, then why does UBT appear paradoxical and therefore antilogical? UBT is not merely paradoxical, but “meta-paradoxical” by definition. What does this mean? Paradox is what results from self-referentially applying the negation functor of logic to logic itself within logical bounds, and avoiding paradox is precisely what gives logic its discernability and utility. But if avoiding paradox gives logic its utility, then logic needs paradox in order to have utility (where the utility of logic tautologically resides in its power to exclude the negation of logic, i.e. paradox). This means that both logic and paradox exist in a mutually supportive capacity. But if so, then there is necessarily a medium of existence - a kind of “existential protomedium” or ontological groundstate - accommodating both logic and paradox. UBT is simply the name given to this protomedium, and it is why the CTMU refers to reality as a “self-resolving paradox”.
- UBT and SCSPL are not defined as "two separate things", any more than a chunk of ice floating in a pond is a "separate thing" from the water in the pond. The water in the pond is where the chunk of ice came from and what it is essentially composed of, but the crystalline lattice structure of the ice does not distribute over the pond, and the water in the pond is not distributively bound by this structure. The molecules in the liquid-phase H20 have more degrees of freedom than those in the ice; they are less constrained, and less bound. All that you need do in order to apply this analogy is to take it to its logical conclusion while generalizing your usual idea of containment, replacing ice with SCSPL, the pond and its molecules of liquid water with UBT, and the crystalline molecular lattice of the ice with an SCSPL logic lattice, and to relax your grip on the tidy little picture of a chunk of ice with extrinsic measure bobbing around "in" the water. Any metric imputed to UBT must be intrinsically derivable within SCSPL domains (e.g., by intrinsic mutual exclusion).
- Part of the problem here is that Russell does not accept the notion of null constraint; for him, there must always be some kind of constraint, and despite his inability to define it in juxtaposition to its complement, he takes the position that this initial constraint “just exists”. This, of course, disqualifies Russell from discussing (much less explaining) the genesis of the initial constraint, and in fact, it disqualifies him from even distinguishing the initial constraint from its complement. Sadly, failing to distinguish the initial constraint from its complement is to fail to define or distinguish the initial constraint, and this implies that Russell really has no initial constraint in mind after all. That is, while Russell seems to believe that there must be some sort of initial constraint, he cannot define this constraint by distinguishing it from its negation (if he could, then this would compel him to admit the existence of the complementary relationship between logic and nonlogic, and thus that both logic and nonlogic are superposed manifestations of something very much like UBT).
- It follows that although negation cannot be applied in the usual manner to UBT, which implies that UBT is not what Godel would call a "positive property", it nevertheless “contains” other positive properties in the sense that it represents the suspension of their definitive constraints, and the superposition of the things thereby distinguished.
Jacob asks "From the above quote alone - what is the evidence of the existence of the UBT?" The evidence is logical; it's one of the language-theoretic criteria we've been talking about. To put it as simply as possible, unbound telesis is simply the logical complement of constraint with respect to syntax-state relationships, and is a requisite of any attempt to meaningfully define or quantify constraints such as physical states and laws of nature. Jacob asks "from whence arose the UBT?" Since UBT is nil constraint, it doesn't need to have "arisen"; causes are necessary only in the presence of informational content (that's really the point). Jacob also asks "has the UBT been exhausted?" How can something that is unbound be exhausted, given that exhaustion is a function that would have to bind its argument? Jacob wonders "Why is the UBT free of informational constraint and how do we know this?" We know this by definition...specifically, by a definition logically required in order to form any self-contained description of nature and causality. Jacob goes on to opine that "the CTMU raises more questions than offer any explanations." If this is true, then it is true only within the minds of people who fail to understand it.

**Note: Our reality (SCSPL) is not equivalent to the extrapolated level of reality ascribed to UBT. **